D r a f t D r a f t 2 1 ABSTRACT 2 Management of natural resources at a regional level is a compromise between a variety of objectives 3 and interests. At the local level, the management of the forests depends upon the ownership structure, 4 with forest owners using their forests as they see fit. A potential conflict occurs if the forest owners' 5 management decisions are counter to the interests of society in general or the industry that relies on 6 the forest resource as their raw material. We explore the intensity of this conflict at a regional level in 7 several large boreal forest production landscapes. To explore the conflict, we investigate three main 8 interest groups: (i) economically oriented forest owners, (ii) industry groups (focusing on maintaining an 9 even timber supply) and (iii) a group representing general public interests (focusing on enhancing 10 ecosystem services and biodiversity protection). The severity of conflicts differs between interest 11 groups; we found a minor conflict between the economically oriented forest owners and industry, and a 12 severe conflict among general public interests and the other groups. By quantifying the conflict, 13 visualizing the impacts shared between interest groups, we anticipate that through shared discovery and 14 understanding, forests can be managed to lessen the conflict between interest groups.
D r a f t
INTRODUCTION
2 Managing forests to maintain a balance of the multiple and interrelated social, economic and 3 environmental functions of forests is a crucial challenge for societies. Earlier work has shown that forest 4 management aiming to maximize a single ecosystem services may cause losses in others (MEA 2005; 5 Mönkkönen et al. 2018) . For example, management with a main focus to maximize biomass harvests 6 declined the ability of the forests to provide other provisioning (non-timber forest products), regulating 7 and cultural services (Pohjanmies et al. 2017b ) and may jeopardize biodiversity (Triviño et al. 2017 ).
8
Previous research has mainly focused on mapping and exploring trade-offs among ecosystem services 9 (e.g., Raudsepp-Hearne et al. 2010; Gamfeldt et al. 2013; Lutz et al. 2016) or investigated the coherence 10 of guiding policies (e.g., Makkonen et al. 2015) . Much of this earlier research on trade-offs between 11 ecosystem services in forests has remained at a general level of identifying potential trade-offs among 12 categories of goods and benefits with limited attempts to reconcile conflicting objectives.
13
Solving and easing conflicts between ecosystem services requires an identification and quantification of 14 these conflicts but more challenging is to address the social context of the conflicts. In an environmental 15 protection context, Redpath et al. (2015) define conflict as "situations that arise when two or more 16 parties have strongly held views and one of those parties is attempting to assert its interests at the 17 expense of the other". Different stakeholders have shown to have divergent preferences in the priorities 18 of environment benefits from forests and in forest management practices (Nordén et al. 2017 ).
D r a f t 1 compromise solutions can be challenging as some commodities, such as timber, are considered private 2 property benefiting primarily the landowner while others are considered public goods. Moreover, the 3 benefits from these public goods are generated at different scales, for example, forest carbon 4 sequestration provides a global benefit by reducing atmospheric CO2 levels and mitigating climate 5 change, while natural collectable products (e.g., berries and mushrooms) profit mostly the local 6 community. Private landowners typically lack the incentive to manage land to provide ecosystem 7 services and biodiversity conservation benefits in cases where the benefits produced on their land 8 accrue to others (Mönkkönen et al. 2009 ). Quantifying such conflicts between producing private vs. 9 public goods can help in the development of incentives to make decisions that reflect the value of 10 ecosystem services and biodiversity conservation in general.
11
Regional planning processes have previously explored the interaction between interest groups, and the 12 multi criteria decision-making process to find the most satisfactory alternative solution. To study the effects of forest management on the delivery of ecosystem services, we simulated the 6 development of forest stands in our study region. Our study areas are located in southern and central 7 Finland and encompass a set of 17 watersheds which we analysed simultaneously (Fig 1) . These 3
The objectives and values of the interest groups 4 For this study, we evaluate forest management using a multiple criteria approach to express the values 5 of three regional level interest groups. These interest groups are the forest industry, private forest 6 owners and the general public. To simplify the analysis, we have decided to first clearly define the key 7 objectives of each interest group, we will then explore the decision space with more nuanced objectives.
8
For the forest industry, the key objective is to maximize the steady flow of timber resources from the 9 forest. For forest owners, the key objective is to maximize the economic value of the forest, represented 10 by the net present value (NPV) of the timber extracted and standing timber in the forest. For the general 11 public, the key objective is to maximize mutifunctionality of a selection of ecosystem service and 12 biodiversity indicators.
13
The ecosystem services considered were carbon storage and bilberry yield while the biodiversity 14 indicators were deadwood volume and a combined habitat suitability index representing six vertebrate 15 species. To avoid double counting of timber production (an ecosystem service, of specific focus of the 16 timber industry), we have excluded it from the multifunctionality measure. Carbon storage was 17 evaluated as the sum of the carbon in the above-and below-ground biomass (evaluated as 50% of the 18 dry biomass) and the carbon in the soil (using Yasso07 models for mineral soil ( To explore the efficient frontier between all three interest groups, we propose the following problem 19 formulation:
, ∈ (0,1), We mapped a frontier of the Pareto efficient solutions by evaluating the range between the theoretical 10 maximums and minimums. This frontier allows for the visual evaluation of trade-offs between the 11 selected criteria. As the multifunctionality (MF) was used as a constraint, the frontier can be seen as 12 steps, where there are systematic lines representing specific thresholds for the multifunctionality. As the 13 forest owner perspective is directly related to the NPV, a choice of an appropriate discount rate was 14 required, for this study we used a discount rate of 3%. All optimizations were performed using the 15 commercial optimization software (CPLEX version 12.8).
RESULTS

17
Managing conflicts between interest groups will require a trade-off between the gains for one interest 18 group and losses for another interest group. For this example, we have evaluated the conflict from two 19 perspectives. The first is an extreme case when each interest group solely focuses on their own 20 objective. For the second case, we aimed to map a realistic perspective to provide a frame for the 21 conflict between the interest groups ( industry interests are maximized, the multifunctional value of the forest is minimized. This reflects a 2 severe conflict between managing the forest for the general public benefits versus solely for industrial 3 or economic benefits for forest owners. However, if each of the interest groups is not solely motivated 4 by a single objective, this conflict is significantly reduced (Table 2b ). However, the general trend 5 remains, where conflict between public benefits and both forest industry and economically interested 6 forest owners are the highest. For instance, if the forest is managed according solely to the forest 7 industry interests, the general public will achieve 58% of their targeted desire for multifunctionality (a 8 multifunctionality value of 0.29), while the net present value achieve 89% of the targeted NPV 9 (representing a NPV of 7800 €) (Table 2b ).
10
To explore the entire range of potential conflicts within the interest groups, we have created a Pareto 11 efficient front of solutions as a 3-D surface (Figure 2) . We represent this surface as a series of production 12 possibility frontiers. This surface highlights the potential regional level conflict of the interest groups. If 13 the interest groups hold an extreme position with regard to their objectives (the vertices of the 3-D 14 surface in Figure 2 ), these points represent the maximum conflict possible (i.e. the points highlighted in 15 Table 2a ). Any relaxation from these extreme perspectives will result in a reduction in any conflict. The 16 severity of conflict between three perspectives on forest management differs between studied interest 17 groups. The interior grey triangle represents the range of conflicts between the targeted cases of the 18 interest groups where each interest group is not solely motivated by a single objective but is willing to 19 make compromise (i.e. the targets set in Table 2b ). Compared with the extreme cases, the surveyed 20 objectives highlight the mitigated need for compromise between all interest groups. In each of the 21 graphs of Figure 2 3
The potential conflict differs between interest groups. The industry and public interests have a relatively 4 even conflict, from either optimal perspective; both interest groups must give up a similar normalized 5 value in the compromise solution (Figure 2a ). The conflict between the general public and forest owner 6 interests has rather similar properties to the conflict between industry and public interests (Figure 2b) ; 7 however, there is much narrower range of possible solutions than between the industry and public 8 interests. This equality in conflict is not demonstrated in Figure 2c , where the industry and individual 9 forest owners have an unbalanced compromise. To meet the main objective of industry groups (much 10 higher even-flows of timber), forest owners will see only minor impacts on the timber revenues 11 (measured as net present value) of the forest. In Figure 2c , this can be seen through the relative changes 12 in the performance of each objective, if the focus is on industry groups we obtain an even-flow of timber 13 of around 1,300 m 3 /ha per period and a net present value of 8,300 € per hectare. With a focus on forest 14 owners, the net present value obtained increases by around 1,500 € per hectare (to 9,800 € per hectare) 15 while the even flow of timber decreases by 830 m 3 /ha for each period (to 460 m 3 /ha for each period).
16
This highlights the fluctuation in timber extraction if the forest owners solely rely on making harvesting 17 decisions based on maximizing the net present value of their forests.
18
Forest management decisions offer options to mitigate the conflict between interest groups. For each 19 solution used to generate the Pareto frontier, it is possible to examine the specific management regimes 20 used. For the entire range of solutions, Figure 3 shows the case when the maximization of NPV ( Figure   21 3a) and even-flow of timber resources (Figure 3b ) is subject to a multifunctionality constraint. the entire gradient of the multifunctionality requirement. To obtain maximal multifunctionality for the 8 general public, a modest level of harvesting activities is allowed and composed primarily of the 9 management regimes CCF (27 -30%) and delayed harvest BAU with green tree retention (5 -7%). These 10 management regimes are dominating due to their influence on some specific criteria; for example, the 11 CCF management option produces large quantities of bilberry, while the specific BAU management 12 option increases the quantity of deadwood for a period following harvest actions.
DISCUSSION
14
The focus of this study was to explore, quantify and ease the potential conflicts between three key 15 stakeholders in forest management planning: forest owners, industry requirements and general public 16 and suggest alternatives mitigate the conflict. We present a surface of relevant solutions to highlight a 17 novel perspective that may assist interest groups in understanding the severity of conflict within the 18 groups. This is done through an exploration of the three-dimensional range of possible outcomes. We 19 provide guidance from an optimized landscape perspective, which is notoriously difficult to accomplish, 20 due to inefficiencies caused by the ownership structure and priorities of individual forest owners 21 (Eriksson and Hammer 2006; Angelstam et al. 2011) .
22
To generate this range of possible outcomes several assumptions were taken to reflect various sources 23 of preferential information. An assumption was taken on the key priorities of the different stakeholders, D r a f t 1 highlighting what could be evaluated as potential extreme views. We also assumed that differences 2 between different objective values (for the different stakeholders) were of equal importance. These 3 assumptions were taken to simply explore the frontier of decisions. To incorporate real preferential 4 information into the decision process, alternative methods of incorporating preferential information 5 may be needed, such as interactive decision making processes (Ruiz et al. 2019 ).
6
Our results highlight that the highest potential conflict is between the general public (focusing on non-7 economic benefits) and the economic interests of both the forest industry and economically orientated Additionally, while there is real conflict between these groups, the portrayal of the severity of 2 the conflict may be exaggerated as a political tool. For instance, to gain acceptance for projects causing 3 environmental damage, their economic benefits may be exaggerated (O'Faircheallaigh 2010).
4
One of the main aims of environmental management research has been to search for 'win-win' 5 situations (Tallis et al. 2008 ). The idea is that there are management options that are both economically 6 sound and environmentally friendly. Unfortunately, intense resource extraction is more often in direct 7 competition with ecological goals than it is in harmony (McShane et al. 2011) . When considering 8 between Pareto efficient management alternatives, the potential for any 'win-win' situations are 9 explicitly unavailable. Fortunately, in our study, the surface of efficient solutions is concave, and a small 10 change in one objective can result in a larger increase of another objective. This choice is still one that 11 requires one interest group to be worse off in order to benefit another interest group. The planning 12 process requires a compromise, selecting a solution that balances the outcomes for all interest groups 13 (which may result in an equally unappealing outcome to all interest groups).
14 The severity of the 'realistic' conflict between groups shows the potential to meet at a not entirely 15 undesirable solution for each interest group. To find a potential compromise solution that can be 16 acceptable should be possible, if the interest groups are willing to negotiate or willing to be influenced 17 by the other interest groups position. Participatory planning has shown promise in facilitating dialog 18 amongst stakeholder groups, and can be an effective tool if the stakeholders can influence the final 19 decision. By being able to influence the decision implies providing stakeholders power in the process, 20 reflecting Citizen Power from Arnstein's ladder of participation (Arnstein 1969). In Finland, participatory 21 planning processes have been used extensively in recent history; however the current trend in state 22 owned forests is a lower participation from the general public in the planning process (Tikkanen 2018).
D r a f t 1 On privately held forests, participatory planning processes may have little value, as the forest owner 2 serves as the sole decision maker. For these cases, alternative tools that provide incentives to forest 3 owners to manage their forest in a specific way would be more beneficial (such as METSO in program 4 Finland, https://www.syke.fi/metso/en). To improve the performance of these voluntary based 5 conservation programs, a dialogue-approach for voluntary based conservation can provide stakeholders 
19
In order to meet the needs and ease the conflicts among the different forest stakeholders the 20 diversification of management regimes is essential. We found that in order to find a balance that meets 21 the needs of all interest groups, the forest should be optimally managed primarily through set-asides, 22 continuous cover forestry and green tree retentions. These findings are in line with previous studies that 23 have shown that continuous cover forestry often outperforms clear-cut forestry in providing timber, D r a f t 1 non-timber ecosystem services and biodiversity (e.g., Lundmark et al. 2016; Tahvonen and Rämö 2016; 2 Pukkala 2016; Peura et al. 2018) . Moreover, continuous cover forestry is clearly dominating when 3 maximizing the income of forest owners (Fig. 3a) , and rotation forestry dominates when maximizing the 4 periodic even-flow of timber (Fig. 3b ). However, when the aim is the even-flow of timber then the 5 proportion of the forest managed under continuous cover forestry is reduced because it is more difficult 6 to ensure maximum timber flow over time with continuous cover forestry than with the business as 7 usual clear-cut forestry.
The exact interpretation of the metrics used for the different stakeholder perspectives requires careful 9 consideration. For the economically orientated forest owners we relied on the NPV, using a constant 10 discount rate of 3% reflecting the rate commonly applied in European countries for evaluating social 11 policies or projects (see Johansson, P.-O., and Kriström 2012 and references therein). The choice of the 12 discount rate influences the timing of harvests. The implications for this study are that if the discount 13 rate is changed, changes will occur between the conflict of forest owners and the industry perspective.
14 For the general public, we rely on a measure of multifunctionality. The evaluation of multifunctionality 15 depends on the criteria selected and the potential range of each criteria. Thus, this metric requires 16 careful explanation to the stakeholders, as it is relative measure and needs unique interpretation for 17 each decision process. For both of these metrics, the exact impact will depend on the structure of the 18 forest, the extent of the planning horizon and management alternatives used in the analysis. If there is 19 an even distribution of age classes, with little forest above regeneration age, then there will be very little 20 conflict. For the case when there is an uneven age class distribution, or a large proportion of the stands 21 with an age class above the regeneration age, then there will be significant conflict between these 22 stakeholder groups.
D r a f t 20 1
This study has focused on the efficient allocation of management regimes to optimize between the 2 three different objectives mimicking the preferences of different interest groups. Any adjustments to 3 the use of the forest resources away from this frontier will result in inefficiencies, and will affect the 4 provision of the various criteria under consideration. Introduction of inefficiencies will likely increase the 5 conflict between these stakeholder groups. If the forest owners or industry groups are primarily of 6 interest, the inclusion of inefficiencies will likely improve the benefits provided to the general public 7 interest group. This is due to increased potential for increasing rotation periods, and simply not 8 harvesting forested stands.
CONCLUSION
10
With multiple demands placed on the use of natural resources, management of these resources requires 11 prioritization based on the needs and desires of various interest groups. Acknowledging the potential for 12 conflict between interest groups is important and can be useful in highlighting the imposition of 13 compromises in the decision-making process. These conflicts amongst stakeholders may be eased Definition Sets:
Set of criteria use in analysis Set of time periods under consideration Set of all forest stands Set of all management regimes for forest stand j Data:
The value of criterion t when conducting management regime k on stand j for period p * , * , *
The ideal value obtainable for each interest group * , * , * The anti-ideal value obtainable for each interest group Variables:
, ,
The deviations away from the maximal value possible for each interest group , ,
The value obtained for each interest group Decision Variables:
The decision to manage stand j according to management regime k Parameters:
The discount rate Threshold value used when evaluating multifunctionality Value highlighting the relative importance between industry and forest owner interest groups. 1 2 Table 3 . List of notation used in the problem formulation groups. The interior grey triangle represents the range of conflicts between the surveyed objectives/ 5 more realistic set of objectives of the interest groups In each panel, the objective of the public (PUB) is 6
to maximize the multifunctionality of the forest, the objective of forest industry (IND) is to maximize the 7 even flow of timber, and the objective of the forest owners (FOR) is to maximize the net present value of 8 timber. The production possibility frontiers (PPF) of a specific provision of the third criterion shown in 9 each graph. The PPF lines increase in steps of +3%, with the extreme blue (red) color represents the 10 minimum (maximum) value of the third criterion. Panel (a) illustrates "Industry -Public" conflict and the 11
Forest owners perspective shown as NPV in colour scale ; Panel (b) shows "Forest owners -Public" 12 conflict with the industry perspective shown as Even Flow in a colour scale; Panel (c) shows "Industry -13
Forest owners" conflict with the public perspective shown as multifunctionality in a colour scale. In each 14 graph, we also identify the potential for harmony and conflict zones between the objectives on axes. 15
Evaluation of harmony and conflict is carried out from the center of the targeted conflict triangle. The 16
objectives can be considered being in harmony if an increase away from the center in one objective also 17 improves the value of the other objective (upper right sector) or if decreases are associated (lower left). 18
All other cases indicate conflicts.
D r a f t 30 1 2 Fig. 3 Range of management types when: a) maximizing net present value or b) maximizing the even-3 flow of timber while requiring a pre-defined level of multifunctionality. BAU refers to alternative clear-4 cut based management regimes with variable thinning intensities and rotation lengths (GTR = green tree 5 retention, w thin = with thinnings before clear felling, wo thin = with no thinnings). CCF refers to 6 continuous cover forestry with not final felling by clear-cut, and set aside denotes permanent protection 7
(no management). The red and blue dots respectively represent the percentage of maximum NPV and 8
Even flow obtained from each set of management alternatives. For description of management regimes 9 readers are referred to Eyvindson et al. (2018) .
